China’s Ministry of Transport will impose a new “Special Port Service Fee” on U.S. linked vessels from 14 October 2025, aligning with U.S. Section 301 measures taking effect the same day. In its announcement, the Chinese Ministry of Transport criticises the U.S. actions announced in April this year and warns of significant disruption to maritime trade between China and the United States. For more on the application of China’s Special Port Service Fee, based on the Ministry of Transport’s announcement, read our latest post.

On 7 October 2025, the European Commission presented a proposal for a new regulation to introduce rigorous trade measures on steel entering the EU market. The proposal is subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, under which the European Parliament and the Council act as co‑legislators to amend and ultimately adopt the text. We therefore expect changes; however, we highlight the following as the Commission’s key areas of focus:

  • Lower tariff‑free import volumes; higher out‑of‑quota duty
  • Country of ‘melt and pour’
  • Adjustments, country allocations, and bilateral safeguards

For more information, read our full post here.

The distinctive features that set a luxury brand’s products apart aren’t created only on the factory floor. For example, a company’s sketches from Paris, R&D in Milan, and artisanal prototypes perfected in Tokyo all flow into the production line. These upstream inputs (known as assists) must be carefully managed to avoid issues when the final product meets a border crossing. In a recent post, published as part of our Always in Season: Luxury, Fashion, and the Law series, our team explores how global luxury brands can harmonize their approach to assists globally to reduce compliance costs, mitigate the risk of systematic overpayment of tariffs, and stay ahead of customs disputes.

On September 29, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released an interim final rule expanding its controls under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to cover foreign entities owned directly or indirectly, individually or in aggregate, 50% or more by one or more persons listed on (1) the Entity List, (2) the Military End-User (MEU) List, or (3) the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) designated under a program listed in 15 C.F.R. § 744.8(a)(1) (collectively, “Listed Persons”). BIS is referring to these new controls as the Affiliates Rule.

Exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to foreign entities captured by the Affiliates Rule will be subject to the most restrictive license requirements, license exception eligibility, and license review policy applicable to their owners. The Affiliates Rule is effective immediately.

Continue Reading BIS adopts 50% rule to cover affiliates of listed entities

With tariffs and trade measures continuing to reshape global markets, companies are navigating how best to respond, often considering price and supply chain adjustments as part of the process. As antitrust enforcers scrutinize competitor conduct, our antitrust and international trade teams have collaborated to launch a two-part podcast series, focusing on the practical impact of recent developments and key priorities for in-house counsel.

To listen to the full episodes, click the links below:

Following President Trump’s June executive order revoking the comprehensive U.S. sanctions on Syria, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is relaxing the existing restrictions on exports and reexports to Syria under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

The final rule, which is effective September 2, makes the following amendments to the EAR:

  • New License Exception Syria Peace and Prosperity (SPP), which, subject to certain conditions, authorizes exports and reexports to Syria of all items designated EAR99. License Exception SSP does not authorize exports or reexports prohibited under the end-use and end-user controls in Part 744 of the EAR.
  • Expansion of License Exception Consumer Communications Devices (CCD) to include Syria in the destination scope.
  • Revision to and expansion of License Exception Aircraft, Vessels and Spacecraft (AVS) to permit certain equipment and spare parts for permanent use on a vessel or aircraft, and ship and plane stores designated as EAR99 or controlled on the Commerce Control List (CCL) for only anti-terrorism reasons to be sent to Syria. The rule also expands License Exception AVS eligibility to include exports of U.S.-registered civil aircraft and vessels and temporary reexports of U.S. and foreign-registered civil aircraft and vessels to Syria on temporary sojourn. The license exception does not authorize transactions that support the Syrian police, military, or intelligence end users and end uses.
  • Expansion of the scope of License Exception Temporary Imports, Exports, Reexports, and Transfers (in-country) (TMP) for Syria-destined items by adding (1) certain technology; (2) shipping containers; (3) exports to a U.S. person’s foreign subsidiary, affiliate, or facility abroad; and (4) certain personal protective equipment.
  • Expansion of License Exception Technology and Software—unrestricted’s (TSU) eligibility for Syria to include copies of technology previously authorized for export to the same recipient.
  • Addition of License Exception Servicing and Replacement of Parts and Equipment (RPL) for exports and reexports to Syria except those destined to the Syrian police, military, or intelligence end users or end uses.
  • Expansion of License Exception Governments, International Organizations, International Inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the International Space Station (GOV) to enable operations of certain cooperating governments and inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  • Updated licensing review policy, including (1) a presumption of approval for a broad range of commercial end uses to support economic and business development in Syria and to support the Syrian people and (2) a case-by-case licensing policy for other end uses.

The rule also makes other conforming changes.

Tonzip Maritime Ltd v. 2Rivers Pte Ltd (formerly Coral Energy Pte Ltd) [2025] EWHC 2036 (Comm)

A. Key facts

On 5 November 2021, Tonzip Maritime Ltd (Owners), owner of the vessel CATALAN SEA (the Vessel), entered into a voyage charterparty with 2Rivers Pte Ltd (formerly Coral Energy Pte Ltd) (2Rivers) for the carriage of oil from Primorsk, Russia, to Aliaga, Turkey (the Charterparty).

Continue Reading Refusing voyage orders: Sanctions risk assessments must be based on evidence, not speculation

On August 6, 2025, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) released its annual report to Congress for calendar year 2024. This annual publication includes the 325 covered transactions—consisting of 209 written notices and 116 declarations—that were filed for CFIUS’s review last year.

CFIUS is an interagency committee authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign investment in the United States and the effect of those transactions on U.S. national security. The Committee is required to provide an annual report to Congress containing specific, cumulative, and trend information related to transaction filing.

In 2024, the volume of CFIUS activity remained high, but the number of covered transactions (325 in total) declined slightly compared to 2023. The reported number of covered transactions reflects the total filing volume, which is slightly inflated since some transactions were withdrawn and refiled, resulting in double counting.

Notices

CFIUS received 209 notices for covered transactions. Of note:

  • 116 notices proceeded to the investigation phase (approximately 56%), which is similar to 2023 when 55% of notices proceeded to the investigation phase.
  • 42 notices were refiled after initially being withdrawn once CFIUS informed the parties that the transaction posed a national security risk. Withdrawing the notice gave the parties additional time to consider the proposed mitigation terms.
  • 7 notices were withdrawn, and the transaction was abandoned. In some cases, the parties did not proceed for commercial reasons. In other cases, CFIUS either (a) informed the parties that it was unable to identify mitigation measures that would resolve the national security concerns or (b) proposed mitigation measures that the parties chose not to accept.
  • 2 presidential decisions were issued related to transactions for which CFIUS initiated a review in 2024.
  • 1 notice was rejected by CFIUS.
  • The Finance, Information, and Services sector continued to produce the most non-real estate notices (53%), followed by the Manufacturing sector (33%).
  • Investors from China filed the most notices, followed by investors from France, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore.

Declarations

CFIUS received 116 declarations in 2024, including six related to real estate transactions. In total:

  • 91 were concluded, accounting for over 78% of the declarations filed.
  • 17 requests for notice were made.
  • 1 declaration was withdrawn.
  • CFIUS was unable to conclude seven actions.
  • No declarations were rejected.
  • Investors from Japan, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom filed the most declarations.

Investors from Japan, followed by France, filed the most combined notices and declarations, which was a shift from China having the most CFIUS filings in prior years.

Timelines

Timelines and process efficiency remained relatively stable year-over-year, with moderate increases in review and investigation times in 2024:

  • Draft notices: On average, CFIUS provided written comments within 6.5 days of a draft notice being submitted.
  • Formal written notices: On average, CFIUS accepted formal written notices within 2.7 days for submission.
  • Reviews: CFIUS averaged 46.5 days to complete reviews with a median of 46 days.
  • Investigations: On average, investigations took 87.5 days. The median was 91 days.

Mitigation measures

CFIUS adopted mitigation measures and conditions with respect to 25 notices (approximately 12% of the total number of notices filed), which was down considerably from 2023. The 2024 measures included:

  • 16 mitigation agreements or orders to resolve national security concerns as part of concluding the action.
  • 6 letters granting the withdrawal and abandonment of a proposed transaction with conditions imposed.
  • 1 mitigation agreement to address residual national security concerns related to a transaction voluntarily withdrawn and abandoned by the parties.
  • 1 set of measures imposed to mitigate interim risk.
  • 1 presidential order prohibiting the purchase and requirement the divestment of certain real estate.

New mitigation measures included establishing reporting obligations for foreign sales of covered products.

Other developments

The 2024 report also highlights that:

  • The number of agreements monitored remained relatively steady, but site visits nearly doubled in 2024.
  • According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) 2025 Annual Threat Assessment and the 2018 National Counterintelligence and Security Center Report to Congress, foreign economic, industrial, and cyber espionage by foreign actors like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea against the United States continues to represent a significant threat to U.S. prosperity, security, and competitive advantage.
  • In November 2024, the Department of Treasury issued two final rules: one expanding real estate jurisdiction and another enhancing information requirements and increasing penalties.
  • Treasury also hosted its third annual CFIUS conference, providing stakeholders with an opportunity to engage with the Committee on a variety of CFIUS topics and trends.
  • In August 2024, CFIUS announced its largest penalty to date, and at the same time launched a new enforcement web page. While not explicitly named, the largest penalty presumably refers to CFIUS’S resolution of an enforcement action against a telecommunications company resulting in a $60 million penalty, following an initial Notice of Penalty issued in 2023.
  • Pursuant to President Trump’s America First Investment Policy memorandum, CFIUS is reviewing its processes, practices, and authorities to ensure it is positioned to address new and evolving threats that can accompany foreign investment, while maintaining the United States’ strong, open investment environment. This directive, coupled with the 2024 report trends, highlights the importance of considering CFIUS early in the deal process, recognizing it as a potential key in both transaction negotiations and the anticipated closing timeline. 

On 18 July 2025, the EU announced the 18th sanctions package against Russia and Belarus. The legislative texts were published on 19 July 2025. As of this date, the latest restrictions indicate a misalignment between the EU / UK, and other G7 members, including the United States.

Continue Reading EU-nough Russian Oil – EU’s 18th Sanctions Package

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is reshaping the Criminal Division’s white-collar program to focus on tariff and trade fraud. In the past months, DOJ has significantly narrowed the scope of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement. Now, DOJ is dedicating significant additional resources and attention to tariff evasion. On July 10, acting Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Matt Galeotti announced that the Department of Justice’s Market Integrity and Major Frauds Unit will be renamed and will expand its focus to include investigating and prosecuting tariff evasion schemes and other trade fraud. Galeotti told Bloomberg that DOJ is also shifting “significant personnel” from a consumer protection branch to the criminal division as part of this reorganization.

The addition of resources, including assigning experienced white-collar prosecutors to tariff evasion cases shows DOJ’s commitment to rooting out trade fraud and signals a heightened risk of criminal prosecution for companies importing goods into the United States that are misclassified, undervalued, or declared with the incorrect country of origin.

Background

In May 2025, DOJ identified trade and customs fraud, including tariff evasion, as one of the Criminal Division’s top enforcement priorities. Galeotti directed prosecutors to hold individual wrongdoers accountable and “prioritize schemes involving senior-level personnel or other culpable actors, demonstrable loss, and efforts to obstruct justice.”

DOJ also announced an expansion of its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program. Under the expanded program, tips that lead to forfeitures in corporate cases involving “trade, tariff, and customs fraud” are now eligible for monetary awards, increasing the likelihood of insiders or competitors tipping off prosecutors. DOJ has indicated that they are already receiving whistleblower tips and voluntary disclosures related to trade fraud.

What companies can do

In addition to helping importers comply with their reasonable care expectations under the customs regulations, the following steps can also help mitigate potential criminal enforcement risks:

  • Review the country of origin, valuation, and classification of the company’s imports. Although negligent errors in these areas have always created civil enforcement risks, as well as an obligation to pay unpaid duties, origin, valuation, and classification decisions that may have seemed advantageous but have not been appropriately vetted could create criminal enforcement risks. Individual employees who approved these decisions could also be personally exposed.
  • Ensure the company has appropriately designed internal controls. A well-designed customs compliance program, including periodic, independent audits, can help prevent and detect potential issues. An effective whistleblower program also encourages internal reporting, allowing the company to investigate and remediate potential issues. Additionally, these types of controls can mitigate potential penalties if a violation occurs. A focused risk assessment along with periodic testing of operating effectiveness of controls can help bolster compliance with applicable regulations.
  • Train employees to identify and escalate potential “red flags.” Whether the company serves as the importer of record or receives foreign-origin goods after they are imported, employees should be trained to identify potential “red flags” that may indicate tariff evasion is occurring, such as the relabeling of shipping containers or repackaging of goods. Those “red flags” should be escalated within the company’s legal and compliance structure and appropriately investigated. Companies that have reason to know the importer is taking steps to evade tariffs but fail to take steps to further inquire could be subject to criminal investigation.
  • Ensure routine inquiries from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are escalated for review. In many instances, operations personnel may receive and respond to Requests for Information (CF-28s) and Notices of Action (CF-29s) from CBP without escalating those items to the compliance or legal departments for further review. Although these may be routine inquiries, CBP’s questions can also help the company proactively identify errors and evaluate whether to file a prior disclosure to mitigate potential penalties.