In today’s global trade landscape, trade defence instruments (TDI), such as anti-dumping and countervailing (anti-subsidy) duties, are more vital than ever. TDI are measures used to protect EU industry from imports originating from non‑EU countries that distort competition by suppressing EU producers’ prices, typically through dumping or because of state subsidies. The European Commission, specifically its Directorate‑General for Trade, is competent to initiate and conduct investigations that may lead to the imposition of such duties, in addition to regular customs duties, on the relevant goods. The annual TDI conference on 11 December brought together trade practitioners from across the spectrum, including lawyers representing exporters and EU industries, senior European Commission officials, industry associations, members of the EU courts, WTO experts, and academics. Against increasingly complex global trade dynamics, the discussions offered a clear preview of how the EU’s trade defence toolbox is evolving to adapt to the rapidly changing geopolitical context. We’ve translated the insights from the TDI conference into six practical expectations for 2026.

One: Convergence between TDI and economic security. Economic security and trade policy are now tightly coupled. The rebranding of “DG Trade and Economic Security” is more than cosmetic; it frames the Commission’s ongoing review of whether the TDI toolkit is effective and sufficient to address new risk patterns, including persistent global overcapacity and supply-chain vulnerabilities. We expect that the first half of 2026 will be marked by policy work to recalibrate instruments and guidance, tighten enforcement with customs and market surveillance, and align TDI with broader economic security initiatives.

Two: TDI remains central, despite a growing toolbox. Even as new EU instruments emerge, classic anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard tools will remain central to addressing overcapacity and market distortions. The new instruments will supplement TDI. In 2026, stakeholders should anticipate sustained recourse to investigations in sectors where global imbalances persist, along with sharper attention to injury analyses and the selection of measures that deter circumvention.

Three: Resourcing, speed, and due process. The EU Commission is trying to cope with resource constraints, and understaffing is difficult to remedy in the short term. When considering reducing investigation lead times, the authorities will face the challenge of balancing any reduction against the rights of defence. Nonetheless, in 2026, we expect that the EU Commission will work on incremental process efficiencies, which could include changes to simplify questionnaires.

Four: Enforcement priorities. From an enforcement perspective, two observations stand out. First, authorities are increasing scrutiny of e‑commerce warehouses to ensure the effective application of trade defence measures, particularly for consumer goods. Second, the focus is turning to structures such as splitting product components across multiple consignments without economic justification to evade measures. Conduct of this kind is likely to be treated as abuse of law and a breach of customs legislation, drawing both trade‑defence and customs‑enforcement consequences in 2026.

Five: Registration and retroactivity. The EU Commission’s move to automatically register imports in TDI cases has had a chilling effect on trade flows, often triggering a sudden drop in imports. At the TDI conference, participants noted that the predictability of the retroactive application period could preserve the intended deterrent effect of such decisions. We believe the Commission’s automated registration practice will remain in place in 2026. However, if investigation lead times are shortened, the authorities may seek to levy duties retroactively as of the initiation of an investigation, creating an immediate chilling effect on imports.

Six: Particular market situation. Imports originating from countries affected by regional overcapacity may depress domestic prices to such a degree that the Commission finds that a particular market situation exists and adjusts its duty‑calculation methodology, typically resulting in higher duties. We believe imports from countries experiencing excess inflows due to regional overcapacity in certain sectors will come under increasing scrutiny to determine whether a particular market situation exists.

On 17 December 2025, the European Commission published an amendment proposal (COM 2025/0419) to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2023/956), which proposes to expand CBAM to certain downstream goods and strengthen anti-circumvention provisions. The proposal also refines operational rules, including for electricity imports, exemptions, and market-stability safeguards. On the same day, the Commission published several implementing acts addressing issues such as default values, the price of CBAM certificates, methodologies for calculating embedded emissions, and verification principles. It also published a proposal to establish a so‑called “Temporary Decarbonisation Fund”.

This alert focuses on the key amendments included in the Commission’s proposal to amend the CBAM Regulation.

Extension of CBAM to downstream goods

The Commission proposes to extend CBAM beyond the current list of basic materials in Annex I (e.g., aluminium, cement, fertilisers, iron, and steel) to approximately 180 downstream products, with particular focus on steel‑ and aluminium‑intensive goods (see the full list of goods included in the proposal here). These include machinery, hardware and fabrications, vehicle components, domestic appliances, construction equipment, and certain scrap metal. The stated objective, reflected in the Commission’s press release and FAQs, is to address the risk that downstream producers facing higher input costs due to CBAM and the Emissions Trading System (ETS) will relocate to jurisdictions with less stringent environmental rules. This extension to new products is foreseen in Article 30(3) of the CBAM Regulation, which allows the Commission to identify products further down the value chain for potential inclusion.

As stated in the Commission’s FAQs, only emissions embedded in the input materials (precursors) used to make the downstream goods will be subject to CBAM, while emissions from downstream processing or assembly will not be taken into account. To illustrate how it would work in practice, the Commission gives the following example: car doors manufactured in a non-EU country would attract CBAM obligations (e.g., declaring emissions, surrendering CBAM certificates) for the emissions embedded in the steel plates used in their construction, but not for the fabrication of those plates into parts or their assembly. To operationalise this approach, the proposal introduces Article 7(2a) and an Annex VIII into the CBAM Regulation, listing precursors that must be taken into account for embedded emissions calculations. In addition, recognising the complexity of calculating embedded emissions in multi‑component goods, the amendment proposal allows for declaring the embedded emissions in downstream products according to default values.

To preserve market stability, a new Article 27a empowers the Commission, by delegated acts, to exempt the goods listed in Annex I from CBAM’s scope where their inclusion would risk causing severe harm to the Union internal market due to serious and unforeseen circumstances. In parallel, Article 2(11) would allow the Commission to adopt delegated acts under an urgency procedure to add non-EU countries or territories to the list of exempted countries in Annex III.

Reinforced anti‑circumvention framework

Building on the Steel and Metal Action Plan of 19 March 2025, the proposal strengthens CBAM’s anti‑circumvention tools. A new concept of “abusive practices” is introduced in Article 3(35), capturing conduct that seeks to gain a benefit by unduly avoiding, in whole or in part, CBAM financial liability.

Under proposed Article 6(6a), the Commission could require additional supporting documentation for CBAM declarations relating to the identification, combination, and origin of goods. Article 6(7) would allow the Commission to determine categories of products at high risk of abusive practices and to inform competent and customs authorities to intensify controls. In cases of indirect representation, the EORI number(s) of the importer(s) on whose behalf the CBAM declaration is made would need to be provided in the application to become an authorised CBAM declarant, enabling further transparency for the enforcement authorities. Article 7(5) would reinforce record‑keeping requirements, obliging authorised CBAM declarants to maintain records necessary to substantiate embedded emissions calculations.

The proposed amendment also introduces Article 27(2)(c), which brings the artificial adjustment of supply chains to secure lower default values for goods within the definition of a circumvention practice.

Other amendments

For electricity, the proposal introduces some changes to the method for calculating the emissions factor for imported electricity as of January 2026 and allows the Commission to integrate a third-party country into the EU electricity market, thereby exempting its imported electricity from CBAM and subjecting it to the ETS, pursuant to proposed Article 2(7a).

The proposal inserts Article 17(5a), allowing competent authorities to require a financial guarantee from an authorised CBAM declarant that cannot demonstrate adequate financial capacity to fulfil its CBAM financial obligations. The amount of the guarantee may correspond, for example, to the declarant’s estimated annual quantity of imports of CBAM goods.

Practical implications

If adopted as proposed, CBAM would extend to a materially broader set of downstream, steel‑ and aluminium‑intensive products, while limiting the chargeable emissions to those embedded in the specified precursors. Companies importing multi‑component goods should anticipate increased data‑collection demands, the need to substantiate precursor content and origin, and potential reliance on default values where calculation complexity warrants. Electricity importers should prepare for revised default factors from January 2026 and monitor developments relating to market integration‑based exemptions. Across sectors, the reinforced anti‑circumvention rules signal a stricter documentation and control environment, especially for high‑risk product categories and supply chains involving indirect representation.

Next steps

The Commission’s amendment proposal is presented to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, composed of Member State representatives, for debate and a vote on its adoption.

The latest U.S. sanctions designations on China’s independent “teapot”’ refineries signal a more targeted and commercially impactful approach to constraining Iran’s oil exports. This article explores how these measures work and their effectiveness.

Key takeaways

  • The U.S. is sanctioning China’s independent “teapot” refineries to increase pressure on Iran’s oil exports.
  • SDN designations have immediate commercial consequences, cutting affected companies off from the U.S. financial system and discouraging banks, insurers and traders from dealing with them.
  • Restructuring or renaming does not remove risk unless it is clear that the new entity is genuinely separate from the sanctioned one.

During this Trump term, the United States has adopted a more nuanced approach to the “maximum pressure” campaign to squeeze Iran’s oil export revenues.  As China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, that trade route was always under scrutiny by the U.S. authorities.  However, the designation of independent “teapot” refineries is a novel approach that started earlier this year.

Why Hebei Xinhai Chemical stands out

Hebei Xinhai Chemical was targeted in the third round of teapot designations and sent a particularly strong message because, unlike the other teapots that are domestic-facing, Xinhai is a relatively big teapot with full-on crude import quotas.  It is “independent”, but at the same time more connected with the international market.  While the less connected intra-China teapots can absorb or tame the impact of the sanctions, international transactions are where these designations “bite” because being placed on OFAC’s SDN List blocks a company’s access to the U.S. financial system, including the use of U.S. dollars.

How sanctions effectiveness is felt in practice

The “effectiveness” of the sanctions is measured by how much the sanctions are complied with and how much the targeted behavior changes.  Companies’ risk appetites fluctuate based on the exposure they have to the U.S. financial system.  If a non-U.S. company has a lot of U.S. counterparts that it deals with, or has contracts denominated in U.S. dollars, that company will not want to take the risk of an OFAC designation through secondary sanctions.  Even without having a U.S. counterparty, an SDN listing makes the life of a company extremely difficult, where parties including banks and insurers alike – especially in the Western world – will not want to deal with an SDN.

The pattern of U.S. designations targeting different participants of the Iranian oil supply chain, whether it be the vessels carrying these products, the ports receiving them, or the refineries processing them, has certainly been effective in terms of increasing the risk averseness of the parties that may be looking to ship in this trade route.  On the receiving end, it is understood some of the sanctioned teapots are renaming and reorganizing themselves, presumably because these sanctions do bite.

Do restructurings reduce sanctions risk?

As a result of the restructuring activities, if a new entity is formed and it does not have sanctioned ownership, the default position is the new entity would not be considered sanctioned (though it may be targeted in a future action).  However, if the new entity is seen effectively as a “spin-off” of the previously sanctioned entity, then that may be sufficient to deter parties from dealing with it depending on the commercial risk appetite.

A similar issue arises when a previously sanctioned complex expands.  An expanded complex may continue to run into practical difficulties and face risk averseness if it is not clear from the outside that the expanded parts are entirely distinct from the sanctioned parts, in terms of ownership and property interest.

In short, formal corporate restructuring does not necessarily mitigate commercial sanctions risk unless the independence and ownership of the “new” entity can be demonstrated with clarity.

Key takeaways:

  • EU and UK sanctions now increasingly target the full maritime logistics chain, including third country actors
  • Shadow-fleet measures have intensified scrutiny on vessels and operators
  • Compliance has become central to commercial decision-making
Continue Reading How sanctions transformed the shipping industry in 2025

The European Parliament and Council have reached a provisional political agreement to permanently end all imports of Russian natural gas into the EU on an accelerated timetable. The deal brings forward key deadlines for LNG and pipeline gas, tightens limits on contract amendments, enhances anti-circumvention and origin-tracking rules, and strengthens enforcement with significant penalties. Member States will also be required to submit national diversification plans by March 2026. For a concise breakdown of the measures, timelines, and compliance implications, please read our full client alert here.

During the Supreme Court’s oral argument in Learning Resources v. Trump last month, Justice Barrett asked counsel for the private plaintiffs about the tariff refund process if his clients prevail. After some back and forth, she summarized: “So a mess?”

Although the Court has not yet announced when an opinion may be released, entries subject to President Trump’s first tariffs—the “fentanyl” tariffs on Chinese-origin goods—will soon begin to liquidate. Under customs law, liquidation is the point at which duties on an entry become final.

If an entry liquidates, a refund may be foreclosed unless the importer takes action. Thus, importers should understand the standard liquidation cycle and the avenues for pursuing refunds if the Court holds the tariffs are unlawful and refunds are available.

How liquidation works

Most entries liquidate by operation of law approximately 314 days after the entry date. Absent a qualifying exception, liquidation cuts off judicial review and eliminates the possibility of a refund.

The key statutory exception is a timely filed protest. Protests—essentially administrative appeals to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—must be filed within 180 days of liquidation to be timely. If CBP denies the protest, the importer can then sue in the Court of International Trade to challenge that denial.

Liquidation timing vis-à-vis the tariffs

The President has issued four types of tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA):

  • The “fentanyl” tariffs on Canadian-, Chinese-, and Mexican-origin goods. The “fentanyl” tariffs went into effect on February 4 for China and March 4 for Canada and Mexico.
  • The reciprocal tariffs, which went into effect on April 5.
  • The “free speech” tariffs on Brazilian-origin goods, which went into effect on August 6.
  • The secondary tariffs on Indian-origin goods, which went into effect on August 27.

Entries subject to the “fentanyl” tariffs on Chinese‑origin goods are expected to begin liquidating on or after December 15, followed by Canadian and Mexican “fentanyl” entries on January 12, 2026. Entries subject to the reciprocal tariffs are expected to begin liquidating on February 13. Entries subject to Brazil “free speech” tariffs will liquidate on June 16, and entries subject to the India secondary tariffs will liquidate on July 7.

These dates frame the final windows to deploy administrative or judicial tools to preserve refund eligibility for each program.

Learning Resources does not involve a challenge to the Section 232 tariffs on certain aluminum and steel articles and derivative products; automobiles; automobile parts; copper products; lumber, timber, and derivative products; and medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, buses, and parts. Therefore, those tariffs will not be eligible for refunds, regardless of how the Court rules.

Potential refund strategies

Importers should be considering the following potential refund strategies in advance of the Court’s ruling in Learning Resources:

  • Post Summary Corrections (PSCs): CBP may direct importers to submit PSCs on unliquidated entries, which would then trigger the refund process once accepted. This is consistent with CBP’s prior practice for retroactive tariff changes. PSCs generally can be filed within 300 days of entry.
  • Protests: Protests are entry‑specific, administrative appeals filed with CBP. CBP has up to two years to decide protests, so this pathway may be slower for refunds even if the IEEPA tariffs are held to be unlawful. As noted above, protests must be filed within 180 days of liquidation.
  • Lawsuit in the Court of International Trade (CIT): A lawsuit now in the CIT, coupled with a motion for a preliminary injunction directing CBP to suspend liquidation of the importer’s entries, can help provide short-term relief from the administrative burden of tracking liquidation dates and filing protests for every entry since February. If the Court holds the tariffs are unlawful, a lawsuit may also yield faster and more centralized relief for the importer than CBP’s administrative processes. For any entries that liquidate before a preliminary injunction is in place, importers should still file protests to preserve their refund rights.

If you would like to discuss or pursue any of these strategies, please do not hesitate to contact our International Trade and National Security attorneys.

Yesterday, the European Union adopted safeguard measures (C/2025/7842) to curb imports of manganese- and silicon-based ferro-alloys, key alloying inputs for the European steel industry. The decision follows a surge in imports and forms part of a broader policy response to global overcapacity and shifting trade flows in the steel sector. The measures take effect on 18 November 2025 and will be in force for an initial period of three years.

 The safeguard measures conclude an investigation initiated by the European Commission on 19 December 2024 (C/2024/7541) into manganese- and silicon-based ferro-alloys. In launching the probe, the Commission pointed to overcapacity on the global market and an increasing number of trade defence actions by third countries affecting these products, factors that can divert trade towards the EU and lead to injurious import surges. While safeguard investigations are ordinarily concluded within nine months, the Commission found exceptional grounds to extend the inquiry by two months (C/2025/5015), citing the structure of the EU industry and the nature of the products at issue, which require complex economic and legal assessment. The vote on the definitive measures was repeatedly postponed due to the difficulty of securing a majority, particularly because the inclusion of imports from Norway and Iceland under the measures was contentious among member states. The measures, as published yesterday, apply to imports originating in all countries, including those with which the EU has bilateral or regional trade agreements. With the exception of countries that are specifically set out in the published measures, the Commission has determined, consistent with the EU’s World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, that imports of the product concerned originating in developing country WTO Members and in Algeria are excluded from the measures.

The measures apply to manganese- and silicon-based ferro-alloys entering the EU market – specifically, ferro-manganese, ferro-silicon, ferro-silico-manganese, and ferro-silico-magnesium. Silicon and calcium‑silicon, which were initially within the scope of the investigation, have been excluded from the measures due to declining imports or the absence of EU production. Because safeguard measures are designed to address sudden, sharp, and unforeseen surges in imports that threaten serious injury to a domestic industry, the instrument adopted seeks to moderate the pace of inflows and stabilise market conditions for EU producers of these essential steel inputs. This is achieved through the imposition of safeguard measures combining tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) with an out-of-quota variable duty. Imports of products subject to these measures that enter the EU within the allocated TRQ volume will not incur safeguard duty. Imports that exceed the TRQ volume will be subject to a variable duty calculated as the difference between the cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) import price and the price threshold established for the relevant product category (if the former price is lower than the threshold).

The annual TRQ is apportioned into four consecutive three-month periods, beginning on 18 November each year. Similar to the steel safeguard measures, countries with a share of more than 5% of imports over the last three years for the relevant product type (e.g., Norway, Brazil, and India) are allocated country-specific quotas, while imports originating from other countries may claim the residual quota on a first-come, first-served basis, i.e., in the chronological order in which declarations of release for free circulation are accepted. By way of illustration, the price threshold set for ferro-silicon (HS codes 7202 21 and 7202 29) is €2,408 per metric ton (CIF). If the TRQ volume per country and per product category is exceeded and the CIF price of the import is €1,500 per metric ton, the variable safeguard duty due would be €908 per metric ton, reflecting the difference between the minimum sales price and the CIF import price.

Importers, traders, and downstream users should assess the impact of the new measures on sourcing strategies and supply continuity. EU importers of in-scope products must carefully determine the non-preferential origin of the goods they source and assess how the safeguard tariff affects their purchase price. Contract terms, delivery schedules, and customs planning may need to be reviewed in light of the new measures.

Following the EU’s existing embargo on Russian crude oil and petroleum products, the European Commission has proposed, and the Council has now agreed in principle, a complementary Regulation designed to end the remaining inflows of Russian natural gas into the Union. The measure gives legal effect to the Commission’s May 2025 Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports (see our previous client alert here) and forms part of the wider REPowerEU strategy, which is distinct from and separate to the EU’s sanctions programme. It will now proceed to negotiations with the European Parliament before formal adoption.

The Regulation establishes a binding timetable for the phase-out of Russian gas imports, while introducing a uniform authorisation system and stricter transparency requirements across Member States. The Council agreed its General Approach by a qualified majority.

The Council’s agreement represents its General Approach under the EU’s legislative procedure. The next step is for the European Parliament to adopt its own position on the proposal. Once both institutions have agreed their respective positions, negotiations (trilogues) between the Council, Parliament, and Commission will take place to settle the final text. The Regulation will then be formally adopted and published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Our lawyers delve into the details of this Regulation in their latest client alert.

Key Takeaways

  • The measure seeks to close remaining ‘loopholes’ in the EU’s Russian oil embargo and maintain consistency with allied sanctions.
  • The safe-harbour country presumption eases compliance for imports from established crude exporters but can be rebutted by competent Member State authorities.
  • Risk-based due diligence remains essential: importers must be ready to demonstrate non-Russian origin if challenged.
  • Companies should now review supply chains, update contractual clauses, and ensure they can substantiate origin claims in due course.
  • On 15 October 2025, the UK announced intent to impose similar measures in due course.
Continue Reading New requirements for importing CN code 2710 cargo into the EU from 21 January 2026

In continuation of the UK’s sanctions restrictions against Russia, on 15 October 2025, the UK imposed further sanctions on various entities and vessels.

The headline designations include:

  • PJSC Rosneft Oil Company
  • Nayara Energy Limited (which was already subject to EU asset freeze restrictions)
  • Alghaf Marine DMCC
  • PJSC Lukoil

In some regards, these designations mirror the intent of the EU (noting their upcoming 19th sanctions package is intended to impose a full transaction ban on Russian oil majors), signaling joint efforts on the sanctions efforts against Russia between the UK and EU in recent months.

Continue Reading UK Sanctions – Rosneft, Lukoil and others