On January 10, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a sweeping set of actions to further reduce Russian revenues from energy, including blocking two major Russian oil producers, Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, and imposing sanctions on a very significant number of oil-carrying vessels, opaque traders of Russian oil located in jurisdictions like Hong Kong and the UAE, Russia-based oilfield service providers, and Russian energy officials. The U.S. Department of State also took steps to block two active liquefied natural gas projects, a large Russian oil project, and third-country entities supporting Russia’s energy exports. Lastly, the United Kingdom also joined the U.S. in sanctioning Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas – which, coupled with the joint Memorandum of Understanding issued by OFAC and OFSI on January 13, is a testament to the increased cooperation between the U.S. and UK authorities. Although there are wind-downs in place for most of these entities, this round of designations is likely to cause major disruptions in the market. We summarize the new restrictions in turn below:Continue Reading U.S. and UK Intensify Sanctions Against Russia’s Oil Sector in one of the Largest Rounds of Designations Since the Outbreak of the War
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BIS seeks comments on a proposed rule prohibiting transactions involving Chinese and Russian vehicle connectivity system hardware and software
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is seeking comments on a proposed rule that would prohibit transactions involving Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS)[1] hardware and covered software designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of China (including Hong Kong) or Russia. Comments will be due…
EU 14th Sanctions Package against Russia
On 24 June 2024, the EU agreed the long-awaited 14th package of sanctions against Russia. These latest measures introduce several new thematic restrictions and imposed asset freeze measures on an additional 116 individuals and entities including Sovcomflot and the Volga Dnepr Group.
Continue Reading EU 14th Sanctions Package against Russia
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Recent activity in the EU around tariffs on Ukrainian and Russian grain imports
Background
Russia’s military action against Ukraine has had a profound impact on Ukraine’s ability to trade with the rest of the world. Under such exceptional circumstances and to mitigate the negative economic impact of Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, the EU decided in May 2023 to grant sweeping concessions to Ukraine in the form of trade-liberalisation…
EU Clarifies Article 3q for Tanker S&P Market
After various delays, on 19 February 2024 the EU Commission issued its FAQ guidance on Article 3q of Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 (as amended). The FAQ document provides some key clarifications sought by the market. However, some uncertainties remain…
Continue Reading EU Clarifies Article 3q for Tanker S&P Market
The 12th package of EU sanctions against Russia: impact on the tanker S&P market
In a previous update posted on our Trade Compliance Resource Hub on 20 December 2023 (Christmas comes early for G7 operators – EU adopts 12th package of sanctions against Russia, changes to the Price Cap Model), we explored the EU’s latest package of sanctions against Russia in general terms.
One of the key novelties in this package, introduced by way of article 3(q) of Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 (the “Regulation”), that we want to focus on in this briefing is the introduction of an obligations framework around the sale of tankers, and more specifically “for the transport of crude oil or petroleum products”. The self-declared aim of the Regulation is to introduce “transparency” into the sale of this asset class by implementing both back-looking (for any transfer having occurred between 5 December 2022 and 19 December 2023) and forward-looking notification requirements and, in some cases, a pre-approval requirement.
That tankers have been used in circumventing trade-oriented sanctions is beyond dispute, and the widespread references made to the activities of the “dark fleet” is testimony to that. While the purpose of the policy is well understood, the devil is in the detail and the Regulation raises several issues in relation to its practical application and effectiveness.
The policy purports to apply to any owner of such tanker which is an “EU person” in the usual meaning of the term. The applicability of the Regulation to EU registered corporate ship owners is obvious, and merely theoretical in relation to natural persons. A non-EU corporate body being the registered owner is more frequent in practice and some may be tempted, taking a narrow interpretation of the Regulation, to hide behind the corporate veil to disregard the Regulation completely. Based on the EU’s history of intolerance towards, in the context of other article 3 restrictions, and especially in relation to Russian seaborne oil, arguments that a vessel is not an EU vessel but merely beneficially owned or managed by EU persons, this would probably not be prudent. Also note that the EU has clarified through published FAQs that such restrictions apply to vessels “owned, chartered and/or operated by EU companies or nationals”.
In terms of the transactions encompassed by the Regulation, the first point to note is that there is uncertainty in the semantics, as the concepts of “sale” and “transfer of ownership” are used interchangeably throughout article 3(q) when they actually refer to two distinct stages of a sale and purchase transaction (S&P), the former being the entry into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) and the latter, the delivery of the vessel pursuant to the MOA. Also, while the restrictions obviously apply to a sale contract (on usual BIMCO or Nipponsale forms), a transfer of ownership following the exercise of a purchase option in the context of the tail-end of a financial bareboat chartering would also fall within the scope of article 3(q). Where the bareboat charters do not contain the appropriate forward-looking sanctions wording; the owners could find themselves in a difficult spot.
The Regulation also prohibits sales where the vessel is “for use in Russia”, notwithstanding the nationality of the prospective buyer. This is a more complex issue to address in day-to-day sale and purchase transactions. Pending further clarification from the EU, ship owners should insist on including appropriate buyers’ representations and warranties in their MOAs as to the intended use of the vessel and ideally receive a full indemnity from the buyers in case of breach of the representation. Such wording should be carefully drafted, for example so as to include any new sanctions packages between signing of the MOA and delivery.
Another uncertainty will result from the number of different sanctions monitoring entities involved across the EU. The requirements in article 3(q), resulting from an EU regulation, should be uniform across all EU jurisdictions. However, in practice, we expect there to be potential divergence between jurisdictions on the approach to notification requirements. A good example is the Maltese notification template, which requires the resident entity to complete the information required by article 3(q)(4) specified above. But it also requires a “brief explanation regarding the merits of the case/transfer”, which is not explicitly part of the Regulation. As member states continue to implement new monitoring templates, ship owners may face delays when ensuring compliance – the list of information to provide could differ between flag states. Again, inclusion of an information undertaking, or even a wider assistance one, from buyers to help sellers comply with their obligations under the Regulation should be considered.
Clarifications on the practicalities of the Regulation are awaited and our sanctions team have raised these issues with the relevant actors at the EU level. The deadline set as 20 February 2024 for the “looking back” report period is fast approaching. In the meantime, ship owners looking to dispose of their tankers should take a prudent approach, run enhanced Know Your Client checks (KYCs) and include appropriate wording in any MOA to minimize sanctions-related risks, given these are not covered in the standard BIMCO/Nipponsale forms.Continue Reading The 12th package of EU sanctions against Russia: impact on the tanker S&P market
Christmas comes early for G7 operators – EU adopts 12th package of sanctions against Russia, changes to the Price Cap Model
On 18 December, the EU announced their 12th round of sanctions targeting Russia. This comes against the backdrop of a flurry of Russia sanctions related activity and a number of designations of third country actors believed to be engaged in price-cap circumvention.
Continue Reading Christmas comes early for G7 operators – EU adopts 12th package of sanctions against Russia, changes to the Price Cap Model
Superyacht seizures and financing risk associated with sanctions
International efforts to seize assets of sanctioned Russian oligarchs and dispose of them in a timely fashion continue to face obstacles. Among these assets are the TANGO and AMADEA, two superyachts that were seized in the spring of 2022. More than a year and a half later, the TANGO and AMADEA are stuck in legal limbo. Taxpayers fund the staggering cost of upkeep, which (for full upkeep) can per annum be ten percent of a yacht’s total value. The costs include wages for a skeleton crew, insurance, docking fees, diesel supply and general maintenance. Licenses from multiple jurisdictions are often needed to process transactions relating to a frozen asset, making payment for these services even more complicated and time consuming. Continue Reading Superyacht seizures and financing risk associated with sanctions
A little less conversation, more action
As we are nearing the one-year anniversary of the Russian oil price cap, this is an important reminder to operators across the industry that enforcement will be coming.
Continue Reading A little less conversation, more action

New BIS best practice for preventing diversion to Russia: signed export control certificates
As a follow-on to last week’s quint-seal guidance, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published best practice guidance to help prevent high-priority items from being diverted to Russia. The latest guidance focuses on exports of the following high-priority items to counterparties in countries outside the Global Export Controls Coalition (GECC):[1]
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